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In the Suprente Court of the 
State of Utal1 
FAIRFIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ERNEST CARSON and MRS. ERNEST \/ 
CARSON, his wife, 






Appellants' brief opens with a "Statement of the Case" 
which adequately reflects the nature of this controversy. 
Both parties claim the· right to use the water issuing from 
t\vo artesian wells located a short distance west of Fair-
field, Utah. Some of the evidence concerning the use of 
this water in the past was in conflict. The conflicts were 
resolved in respondent's favor by the trial court. The 
statement of facts by apellants recites the evidence which 
they presented, but which the trial court refused to accept 
as true. Appellants omit the conflicting evidence which 
the court found to be true. 
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The appellants at the trial and in their brief on appeal 
bottom their case to a large extent on the fact that they 
acquired ownership of the 1.9 acres of land upon which 
the two wells were drilled. It should be noted that when 
D. L. Thomas acquired the 1.9 acres in 1913 by tax deed, 
the deed was silent as to water (Ex. 2). Under what is 
now Section 100-1-11, U.C.A., 1943, any water rights would 
have followed the land under such a tax deed if the water 
rights had been appurtenant to the land. Black v. John-
son, 81 Utah 410, 18 P. (2d) 901. However, respondent 
contends that (a) the water had been abandoned by Sun-
shine Water Line Company in 1905 and the rights had re-
verted to the public long prior to 1913, (b) that the water 
had been forfeited because of non-use, and (c) the water 
had never been used on the land (the 1.9 acres) and was 
thus never appurtenant to it. The subsequent quiet title 
action against Sunshine Water Line Company did not 
strengthen appellant's position. It did not mention water 
rights at all, and merely quieting title to the land would 
not give any rights to the water unless the water were ap-
purtenant to the land. 
Appellants.' other contention that the water,· even if 
abandoned or forfeited, had been appropriated by appel-
lants through usage, simply can not stand in the face of 
the evidence on usage since 1905. 
Respondent admitted at the pretrial (Pl. 46) that the 
water rights in question were owned by Sunshine Water 
Line Company in about 1895. Respondent does not claim 
any privity with Sunshine Water Line Company, but bases 
its contention that it now owns the water rights entirely 
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upon an apropriation after 1905 when it is conclusively 
shown that Sunshine Water Line Company ceased using 
the water (R. 232,, 160, 351). Respondent contends that 
the water reverted to the public and became subject to pub-
lic appropriation because (a) it was abandoned by Sunshine 
Water Line Company in 1905, and (b) it was forfeited be-
cause of statutory non-use for over seven years. Since the 
water in question was underground water, it could have 
been appropriated until 1935, simply by diversion and ap-
plication to a beneficial use. Hansen v. Salt Lake City, 
(Utah) 205 P. (2d) 255. We have never been able to see 
any logic in the contention made by appellants that this 
water is, insofar as respondent is concerned, surface water, 
but that as to appellants it is underground water. Whether 
water is surface or ground water is a physical fact, and it 
is either ground water as to both of us or it is surface wa- · 
ter as to both. As a matter of fact, the water does come 
from dug wells which are over 80 feet in depth, (R. 157) 
and it is underground water. However, even if it must be 
classed as surface water, because it comes to the surface 
through artesian pressure, it makes no difference here for 
the only application filed with the State Engineer after 
1905 and prior to the trial was filing No. 21275, made by 
respondent. Thus respondent either appropriated the wa-
ter by usage, if it be classed as ground water, or by appli-
cation if it be classed as surface water. 
The respondent's position can best be presented by dis-
eussing the pertinent facts in connection with the various 
propositions of law involved. The order of presentation 
will, for the most part, follo\v that used by the appellants. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE WATER ISSUING FROM THE WELLS 
WAS NEVER APPURTENANT TO THE 1.9 ACRES O·F 
GROUND ACQUiRED BY APPELLANTS, AND THEY 
ARE NOT THE. SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST TO SUN-
SHINE WATER LINE. COMPANY. 
As point number 1, appellants urge that they are the 
successors in interest to the Sunshine Water Line Compa-
ny. They have no deed to the water. The tax deed dated 
August 4, 1913, describes the 1.9 acres of land, but is silent 
as to water (Ex. 2). Since 1880 there has been a statute 
providing that appurtenant water rights pass with a deed 
to the land unless expressly reserved. Laws of Utah 1880, 
Sec. 9, Chapter 20. The section in effect when D. L. 
Thomas (predecessor of appellants) acquired the tax deed 
was Section 52, Chapter 108, p. 160, Laws of Utah, 1905. 
This statute was almost identical to Section 100-1-11, U. 
C. A., 1943. Under a statute such as this when water rights 
are expressly mentioned, the burden is on appellants to show 
that the water from the wells was, in 1913, when the tax 
deed issued, appurtenant to the land conveyed. See Kin-
ney, Irrigation & Water Rights, Vol. 2, p. 1794. 
Whether or not a water right is appurtenant to a par-
ticular tract of land is a question of fact. Re. Johnson's 
Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 P. 748; Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 
93 Utah 236, 72 P. (2d) 630. 
We contend, and th~ cases hold, that water must be 
used on or for the benefit of the land before it will be con-
sidered appurtenant to that land. This seems clear from .. 
Section 100-1-11, U. C. A., 1943, which expressly makes 
the water appurtenant to the last land upon which it was 
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used. It states that when water is used on several tracts, 
the water \vill pass with the parcel of land upon which it 
was used "next preceding the time of the execution of any 
conveyance thereof.'' This is very material here, because 
the water from the \Veils has never been used on the 1.9 
acres of land which appellants acquired by mesne convey-
ances from Sunshine Water Line Company. (Evidence 
detailed below.) In fact, the only use of the water by Sun-
shine Water Line Company was at the mine some five miles 
a\vay (R. 156). 
In Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 72 P. (2d) 
630, the court noted: (p. 259 Utah Reports) 
"Before Cortella can rely on ownership of a wa-
ter right as an appurtenance to his land, he must first 
show that such right was an appurtenance, one essen-
tial of which is that the water right was in fact used 
upon said land.'' 
The court went on to hold that Cortella could not maintain 
an action based on the theory that ownership of the land 
carried with it as an appurtenance a right to receive water, 
because he had failed to show that the water was, in fact, 
being used on the lands at the time he acquired it. 
This matter was also considered generally by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Woolley v. Dowse, 86 Utah 221, 41 P. 
(2d) 709. There the court noted that the water in ques-
tion was not at the time of the sale used on the tract in 
question and that it had not been used on the tract for over 
20 years. The court, on the strength of this fact alone, 
held that the water was not in fact appurtenant to the land 
and must be treated as entirely unconnected with the land. 
In Duchesne County v. Humpherys, 106 Utah 332, 148 
P. (2d) 338, the county had acquired title to certain lands 
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by tax deed. It was asserted by reason of the tax title the 
county had acquired the ownership of several applications 
'· to appropriate water. The court noted that the water had 
never in fact been used on the lands thus sold to the coun-
ty. The court, therefore, held that the water was not ap-
purtenant to the land and that no interest passed to the 
county. 
In Melrose v. Cooley, (Cal.) 196 P. 105, plaintiff's hus-
band owned a placer mine known as the Missouri Placer. 
He constructed a pipeline and flume on this claim to divert 
water from a stream known as Missouri Ravine. The wa-
ter was not used on the Missouri Placer, (where the diver-
sion was made and the line constructed) , but was taken 
to another placer claim known as the Ocean Star. He con-
veyed the first placer to his wife (plaintiff) by a deed that 
was silent as to the water and pipeline. Plaintiff claimed 
ownership on the theory that they passed to her as ap-
purtenances. 
The court said: 
" . it (is) clear to our minds that the 
plaintiff acquired no interest in the pipeline by virtue 
of the conveyance to her by her husband of the Mis-
souri Placer mine. There was no mention of the pipe-
line in said instrument of conveyance, and the said 
pipeline was neither appurtenant to nor a fixture of 
said mine, for it was not used or even intended to be 
used with that mine or for its benefit or in working 
or developing said mine.'' 
The California case is a close parallel to the instant 
case. Here, as the facts detailed below will show, Sunshine 
Water Line ·Company did not use the water on the 1.9 acres 
where the wells. were drilled. It pumped the water some 
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five miles to a mine. ·clearly a purchaser of the mine, at 
the time the pumps were operating, would have acquired 
the water as an appurtenance to the mine. 
To the same effect, that \Vater must be used on the 
land in order to be apurtenant to it, see Wiel, Water Right 
in the Western States, Vol. 1, p. 586, wherein it is stated: 
''Whether a water right is an appurtenance, de-
pends on whether it is an incident, necessary to the 
enjoyment of the land. The water right is not neces-
sarily appurtenant to or parcel of any land; and wheth-
er it is an appurtenance or parcel is a question of fact 
resting chiefly upon whether it was used specially for 
the benefit of the land in question. When used for ir-
rigation, there will seldom be doubt of such necessity. 
A water right or ditch right is appurtenant only to 
such land of a large tract as had been actually irri-
gated from it. A water right is incidental or appur-
tenant to land when by right .used with the land for 
its benefit." 
See also Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights, Vol. II, 
sec. 1011, p. 1803. 
In the light of the above authorities we submit (1) 
that the burden of showing that the water was appurten-
ant to the 1.9 acres was on appellant, (Kinney, p. 1794) 
and (2) that since the evidence shows conclusively that 
the water was never used on nor for the benefit of the 1.9 
acres it was never appurtenant thereto. 
There is no evidence from which the trial court could 
have found that the well water was ever used on or for the 
benefit of the 1.9 acres of land which appellants acquired 
by mesne conveyances from Sunshine Water Line Com-
pany. Appellant Ernest Carson admitted that there was 
no use of water on the 1.9 acres. On page 11 he said he 
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could think of no use made of the water except at the 
mine; p. 14, there had never been any feed racks on the 
1.9 acres; p. 15, no stock watering troughs or other facili-
ties; p. 18, he never saw water being used to irrigate the 1.9 
acres (R. 11, 14, 15 & 18). Engineer Gardner testified that 
it was not possible to irrigate the 1.9 acres by gravity from 
the wells, that the wells were located on the· extreme south 
edge of this 1~9 acre tract and the slope was to the south 
(R. 115) . Exhibit E shows location of the wells on the 1.9 
acre tract (R. 112) . Later in the trial Ernest Carson tes-
tified about a small garden near the well, but he admitted 
that he did not know whether or not any part of it was on 
the 1.9 acres (R. 456). Witness Thomas also testified that 
the 1.9 acres was not irrigated from the wells (R. 161). 
Every witness testifying who could remember back 
prior to 1905 testified that waters from the wells, and the 
sump which was used before the wells were drilled, were 
pumped by Sunshine Water Line Company to the mines 
located some five miles from the wells (R. 156, 157, 159, 214, 
230). There can be no doubt that the sump and the wells 
were dug to supply water for the mine. There is no evi-
dence that Sunshine Water Line c·ompany had any other 
land in the vicinity of the wells, nor that it had any oper-
ations around the wells except a pump house for lifting the 
water to the mine. The court in findings 3, 6 and 7 ex-
pressly found all of the above facts to be true. Then in 
finding number 8 it found that the holes in the ground and 
the well casing were a part of the real estate, not as an ap-
purtenance, but because they at all times were so situated 
that they became part of it. From this last fact the court 
concluded that the "water rights" were appurtenant to the 
1.9 acres of land. This, we submit, was erroneous. The 
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water right is not the hole nor the casing. It is the right 
to use the water issuing from the wells. This right was 
not acquired for the benefit of the 1.9 acres, it was not used 
on said land, and the rights were not appurtenant to the 
land. 
Since the water rights were not appurtenant to the 
1.9 acres, and since appellants acquired no other lands from 
Sunshine Water Line Company, there is no privity between 
Sunshine Water Line Company and appellants. The tax 
deed and the subsequent action quieting title to the land 
did not pass to appellants any interest in the water, and 
because of this fact alone they cannot succeed on the the-
ory that they are successors in interest to Sunshine Water 
Line Company. In addition, it is clear that the water had 
reverted to the public prior to said deeds, and even an ex-
press deed from Sunshine \Vater Line Company in 1913 
could have passed nothing. This is discussed below as point 
II. 
II. SUNSIDNE WATER LINE COMPANY EITHER 
(A) ABANDONED ITS WATER RIGHT, OR (B) LOST 
THE RIGHT BY REASON OF NON-USER UNDER THrE 
FORFEITURE STATUTE. 
We contend that under the evidence the court correct-
ly found that Sunshine Water Line Company abandoned 
the wells and all of its rights therein. We distinguish in 
this regard between abandonment and forfeiture. The for-
mer we consider to be an intentional relinquishment of a 
right, and the latter the forced relinquishment which comes 
from continuous non-use for the statutory period~ Wells-
ville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land and Live-
stock, 104 Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. Abandonment does 
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not depend upon any particular lapse of time. Rather, the 
intent of the appropriator, as evidenced by conduct, should 
be considered, and is to a very large extent controlling. 
Abandonment 
The cases which distinguish between forfeiture and 
abandonment and which ·discuss the elements of abandon-
ment are as follows: Promontory Ranch Co. v. Argile (1904), 
28 Utah 398, 79 P. 47; Deseret Livestock v. Hooppiania, 
(1925) 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479; Torsak v. Reukabina, 
(1926) 67 Utah 166, 246 P. 367; Hammond v. Johnson, 
(1937) 94 ,Utah 20, 66 P. (2d) 894; and the Wellsville case, 
supra. 
These cases hold that two things are necessary for an 
abandonment: (a) An intention to abandon, or relinquish 
the right, and (b) an act to effectuate that intent. The 
appellants in their brief talk only of statutory forfeiture, 
and assert that the forfeiture statute could not have been 
intended to apply to underground water. This argument, 
of course, does not consider the question of abandonment. 
Abandonment has always been known to the common law. 
It has not been restricted to water rights or to any other 
particular species of property. Any property can be and 
for centuries could have been abandoned under common 
law principles. This was not dependent on any statute and 
was always known to water law, independent of statute. 
The subject matter· is fully discussed by Weil, "Water 
Rights in the Western States.," Vol. 1, Chap. 604, Sec. 567. 
The discussion by Weil of the common law principal of 
abandonment, as related to water, covers over ten pages 
and is followed by an equally lengthy discussion of the 
doctrine of forfeiture. We will not lengthen this brief by 
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quotes, but note only that Weil states that the law of ap-
propriation arose as a branch of the law of possessory 
rights on the public domain. The retention of possession 
with a bona fide intention has always been a condition up-
on which retention of the right was based. The relinquish-
ment of possession with the intent to abandon has always 
constituted an abandonment of the right. This required 
a concurrence of act and intent. The act had to constitute 
a relinquishment of possession and the intent was an in-
tention not to resume possession for beneficial use. Aban-
donment is always a voluntary matter. Weil goes on to 
note that abandonment must be made by the owner with-
out any desire that any other person shall acquire the own-
er's interest in it. There is no such thing as an abandon-
ment to a particular person or abandonment for a consid-
eration. The right, once abandoned, can not be revived 
by a sale, and a purported sale passes nothing. 
In view of the numerous Utah cases which have rec-
ognized the doctrine of abandonment and the uniform rec-
ognition of the doctrine by all of the text writers., there 
would seem to be no doubt under the authorities that any 
water rights could have been abandoned in 1905. In fact, 
the Promontory Ranch case, supra, was decided in 1904, 
and \Vhile the court there held that the facts did not show 
an abandonment, the court, nevertheless, recognized the 
doctrine. It should also be noted that in an earlier case, 
Stalling v. Ferrin, 7 Utah 477, decided in 1891, the doctrine 
of abandonment :vvas expressly recognized, and the court 
expressly held that an irrigation ditch which had been 
ploughed over and the ground planted to grass had been 
abandoned. 
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The trial court expressly found in this case that there 
had been a common law abandonment. (See Conclusion of 
Law No. 6). The facts upon which such conclusion was 
based were not disputed. In 1898 the Sunshine Water Line 
Company acquired 1.9 acres of land, upon which the wells 
were drilled (Defendant's Exhibit 2). At some time prior 
to 1900 the company dug a sump on this 1.9 acre tract, and 
water was pumped from the sump for a distance of ap-
proximately five miles to certain mine properties (R. 152, 
156, 97, 155, 230). In about 1900 the two wells in ques-
tion were drilled, one to a depth of approximately 160 feet, 
and the other to a depth of about 80 feet (R. 157). After 
the wells were drilled, the water flowed into the sump and 
was then pumped to the mine (R. 154-7). The water was 
used by Sunshine Water Line Company only for the mine; 
it had no use whatever for the water in the vicinity of the 
1.9 acres. The evidence showing no use on the 1.9 acres is 
detailed under point I. 
In 1905 Sunshine Water Line Company ceased its 
pumping operations. This date was definitely fixed by two 
witnesses (R. 160, 232, 351) and there is no evidence to 
the contrary. No use of this water by Sunshine Water 
Line Company has ever been made since that date. Sun-
sine Water Line ·Company did not pay its taxes in the year 
1905, and the lands were sold for the 1905 taxes (Ex. 2). 
The taxes were not paid thereafter on the land, and Sun-
shine Water Line Company lost title to the land by reason 
of the tax title (Ex. 2). Thomas testified that Sunshine 
Water Line Company abandoned everything in 1905 and 
sold the pipeline (R. 160); and that the company was de-
'funct (165). The pipeline was taken up and the pumping 
facilities dismantled (R. 11, 160, 232, 309). Witness DuBois 
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testified that in 1911 he worked on a project removing one 
segment of the line. At that time other segments had 
already been removed. The digging which was done in re-
moving the other sections had been done so long ago, that it 
was difficult in 1911 to ascertain where the pipeline had pre-
viously run, for time had erased almost all signs of previous 
digging (R. 309). Upon this showing that Sunshine Water 
Line Company was defunct, that it had ceased pumping, . 
had taken up its pipeline, and had permitted the land and 
all facilities to be sold for taxes in 1905 and had abandoned 
everything, the court concluded that there was an ab~n­
donment of the water. This, of course, was also accom-
panied by the fact that from 1905 to 1913 when D·. L. 
Thomas purchased the 1.9 acres on tax sale, no use what-
ever \vas made of the waters by Sunshine Water Line Com-
pany (R. 30, 166, 344). 
Whether or not a \Vater right has been abandoned is 
always a question of fact, which is for the the tryer of the 
fact, in this case, the trial court. The court found as a 
fact that there was an abandonment. The evidence ad-
duced from which the court found an abandonment is cer-
fully adequate to support that conclusion as a factual mat-
ter. Since the water was abandoned, it reverted to the 
people and became subject to the law of appropriation. 
This being true, it is immaterial whether or not the facts 
also show a forfeiture, but we think the facts also would 
show a statutory forfeiture, and it is to be noted that the 
court also ruled that there had been a forfeiture. 
Forfeiture 
The first statute on forfeiture in Utah is Section 9,-
Laws of Utah, 1880, Chap. 20. Since that time there has 
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always been a prov1s1on that water rights would be for-
feited if not used. The statute in effect in 1905 when Sun-
shine Water Line Company ceased its pumping operations 
was Chap. 108, Sec. 52, p. 160, Laws of Utah, 1905. It 
was there provided: 
"When the appropriator, or his successor in in-
terest, abandons or ceases to use water for a period 
of seven years, the right ceases, and thereupon such 
water reverts to the public and can again be approp-
riated, as provided in this act; but questions of aban-
donment shall be questions of fact, and shall be de-
termined, as are other questions of fact." 
It is true, as apellants state, that there are numerous 
cases from our Supreme Court in years subsequent to 1905 
holding that underground water belonged to the owner of 
the soil. However, this concept has been changed by re-
cent eases, the most recent of which is Riordan v. West-
wood, (Utah) 203 P. (2d) 922. In that case underground 
water was placed in the same class as surface water inso-
far as being subject to the law of public appropriation is 
concerned. The court expressly noted that water cases 
must now be treated as though such had always been the 
law in this state. If underground water has always been 
subject to the law of appropriation, as this court has now 
held in the Riordan case, then certainly statutes such as 
this forfeiture statute would apply to underground water. 
There isn't any doubt that the present Section 100-1-4, 
U. C. A., 1943, applies to underground water, because it 
expressly says so. It thus appears that there was a stat-
ute in effect at all tirnes from 1905 to 1913, providing for 
forfeiture of water rights for seven years of non-use. There 
also is no doubt under the evidence that the water was not 
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used by Sunshine Water Line Company or anyone else in 
its behalf from 1905 to 1913. All of the witnesses testify .. 
ing about this period freely admitted that they knew of no 
use of the water by Sunshine Water Line Company dur-
ing this period. The appellan1) Ernest Carson said that 
from the time Sunshine Water Line Company quit pump-
ing until 1913 the wells were open and the water was flow-
ing into the spring (R. 30). He also testified that there 
\Vas no use of this water from 1900 until 1930, except peo-
ple hauling it away in wagons for culinary use, and for 
some irrigation of land owned by Ernest Carson's father 
(R. 32). A witness with no interest whatever in the out-
come of this suit \Vas Mr. Jacob, He was there in 1900 and 
was there every year from 1900 until 1930. He testified 
that the water from the wells was running down a small 
ravine into the springs (R. 77-80). Mr. McKinney, who 
was 84 years old, could remember the entire history of 
these \Veils. He testified that the wells ran directly down 
a ravine and into the springs (R. 88). Witness Thomas 
also could remember the entire history of these wells. He 
testified that the water ran directly from the wells to the 
spring (R. 158) that after Sunshine Water Line Company 
quit pumping the water ran directly to the springs (R. 
161). From 1905 to 1913 no one used the well waters; 
(R. 166) they just ran into the springs; (R. 167) they flowed 
all the time. (R. 168) He stated that the wells were not 
capped after 1905. (R. 217) Witness Smith likewise so 
testified, (R. 351, 354) and there simply isn't any evidence 
to the contrary. The water wasn't used by Sunshine Wa-
ter Line Company. after ·1905. No one else claimed privity 
with Sunshine Water Line Company. until 1913, when D. 
L. Thomas acquired the tax deed (Defendants' Ex. 2). 
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Thereafter, Thomas made practically no use of the water 
between 1913 and 1930. There is evidence that he hauled 
small quantities of it away in wagons for culinary use, but 
there is no other evidence of any other direct use by 
Thomas. At this same period of time the wells were treated 
as a public watering hole (R. 82) with all of the surround-
ing dry farmers getting their culinary water from the wells, 
the sheepmen and travelers water their sheep, and except 
for this small quantity of water which was hauled away by 
the general pubUc, all of the water ran directly into the 
springs of the Fairfield Irrigation Company. No one asked 
permission of D. L. Thomas, or any one else, to water there, 
no one attempted to exercise any control over the water, 
and even the appellant, Ernest Carson,. admitted that the 
above situation prevailed (R. 34). 
III. THE WELL WATER WAS APPRO,PRIA TED 
BY THE RESPO·NDENT BY USAGE. 
There are numerous cases which hold that since 1903 
a filing with the State Engineer is indispensable to an ap-
propriation of surface water. See for example, Wellsville 
East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land and Livestock c·o., 104 
Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634; Smith v. Sanders, 189 P. (2d) 
701; Duchesne County v. Humpherys, 106 Utah 332, 148 
P. (2d) 338. 
These cases do not control insofar as underground wa-
ter· is concerned. The statutes governing the method of 
appropriation were not amended to include underground 
water until 1935. Laws of Utah, 1935, Ch. 105. On page 
158_ of Vol. 86 o~ the Utah Reports, Justice Folland recom- _ 
mended to the Legislature in Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 
50, that the appropriation of ground water be brought un-
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der the authority of the State Engineer. This was done 
by the 1935 amendment noted above. Thus until 1935 a 
diligence right to use ground water could be initiated by 
usage alone. Uater in Hansen v. Salt Lake City, (Utah) 
205 P. (2d) 255, the court expressly held that underground 
water could be appropriated by usage alone prior to 1935. 
Insofar as the evidence on usage is concerned, it is con-
clusively in support of the trial court's findings. There 
isn't any doubt under the evidence that from 1905 until 
1934 the wells were uncapped and the water from the wells 
was flowing directly into a small ravine and then into the 
springs. The detail of the evidence will be set out on this 
point below. The wells were located only 375 feet from the 
spring (R. 106). The slope of the ground is from the wells 
to the spring, and the wells are 8.5 feet higher than the 
springs ( R. 106) . The wells ·were drilled a short distance 
east from a natural \Vash or ravine {R. 68, 77, 87, 88, 142, 
153, 158). Because of the slope of the ground and the short 
distance involved, it would have been impossible to hold 
the water issuing from the \Veils out of the springs {R. 113, 
389). There was never any pipeline, ditch or other facility 
\Vhich would convey the \Vater away from the wells after 
1905 when the Sunshine Water Line ·Company line wasta-
ken up {R. 21, 14). There was-no ditch by which water ·could 
be used to irrigate land in the vicinity of the well {R. 223, 
249, 312, 354, 491). Carson testified that he had irrigated 
approximately one acre between the wells and the spring 
(R. 32). l-Ie was not corroborated by any other witness. 
The trial judge inspected the premises where he had an 
opporttmity to see if there were artificial ditches or areas 
which gave the appearance of regular irrigation. There 
were numerous \Vitnesses who testified that there were no 
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artificial ditches, and that the ground gave no appearance 
of having been irrigated (R. 77, 89, 90, 118, 223, 249, 312, 
354, 491). Numerous witnesses testified that the well wa-
ter ran directly from the well into a ravine and down the 
ravine into the spring (R. 158, 161, 177, 209, 210, 215, 220, 
232, 310, 353, 355, 290). Carson himself admitted that 
he knew of no use by Sunshine Water Line Company after 
it quit pumping; (R. 29) that from the time Sunshine Wa-
ter Line Company quit pumping until 1913, the wells were 
open. (R. 30). He knew of no use from 1905 to 1930, ex-
cept people hauling the water away and the claimed irri-
gation of one acre (R. 329). He admits there were only 
about twenty dry farmers and a few sheepmen hauling wa-
ter away (R 33). He admits that the one acre which he 
claims was irrigated was never owned by Sunshine Water 
Line Company (R. 460), nor was it ever owned by anyone 
who owned the land on which the wells were drilled. The 
only time he could remember that the wells were shut off 
prior to 1934 was a few occasions when various people 
would shut off the water from the wells so that the ground 
around the wells would dry enough to permit wagons to 
get up to the pipe (R. 462). He admits the wells were not 
plugged prior to 1934, when the water was pumped to Man-
ning (R 459). Carson said that Sunshine Water Line Com-
pany never used the water after it quit pumping (R. 30), 
and the only use made after 1913 by D. L. Thomas was to 
haul some 300 to 600 gallons a day for dom~stic use (R. 
458). However, Thomas had a well in 1913 or 1914 and 
did not have to haul water after that (R. 485). Numer-
ous other witnesses were called, who had had frequent op-
portunities to observe the wells and every other witness 
testified that the wells were always open and running di-
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rectly into the spring. (See Witness Nichols, R. 67-68; Wit-
ness Jacob, R. 77; Witness McKinney, R. 89, 90; Witness 
Thomas, R. 158, 161, 166-169, 217, 232; Armstrong, R. 289, 
290; Smith, 354-5; Delbert Carson, 395, 389, 390). 
It is, therefore, clear under all of the evidence that the 
wells ran directly into the springs from 1905 until 1934, 
with at the most only small and infrequent uses by the gen-
eral public. Carson testified that he gave permission to 
people to use the well, but on cross examination he con-
fessed that this so-called permission was simply a failure 
to protest (R. 34) . By the time ( 1942) Carson finally took 
control of the waters, by capping the wells, he was Presi-
dent of the respondent company. He capped them after 
having been requested to do so by the State Engineer. 
The evidence was uncontroverted that as the waters 
from the wells reached the Fairfield Springs, they were 
used the year round by the Fairfield people for stock wa-
tering, domestic, culinary and irrigation purposes. No one 
denied that this was so (R. 20) . Of course, all of the wa-
ters of Fairfield Springs were being used for irrigation pur-
poses from a date prior to 1886, (R 147-149) so that as the 
waters reached the springs and commingled with the spring 
waters, the respondent and its predecessors in interest used 
the water all of the time from 1905 to 1934. The trial 
court so found, and the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence is to that effect. 
IV. USAGE BY CARSON AND THOMAS WAS 
N·OT SUFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE AN APPRO·PRIA-
TION. 
The Utah cases make it clear that even public water 
could during certain periods in the past have been approp-
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riated by usage alone, that usage had to be more than an 
occasional use with other members of the public. For ex-
ample, in Patterson v. Ryan, 37 Utah 410, 108 P. 1118, one 
of the parties had used the water intermittently since prior 
to 1903. He had made some improvements which would 
be at least comparable to the "stand pipe" allegedly in-
stalled by D. L. Thomas. Other sheepmen used the water, 
too, as was done in this case. Tfte Supreme Court held 
that this intermittent, non-exclusive use would not con-
stitute an appropriation. On this point (use by Thomas) 
we consider this Patterson case to be directly in point. To 
the same effect, see Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View 
Duck C'lub, 50 ,Utah 76, 166 P. 309. 
In 1934 Carson did lease the well water to a company 
for pumping to Manning. There isn't any dispute that the 
water was piped from the wells to Manning from late 1934 
until August of 1937 (R. 308). If, (a) the water had not 
already been appropriated, and (b) it could be appropri-
ated by usage alone, this usage by Manning would have 
constituted an appropriation. However, if usage alone 
would apropriate this water, it had long since been approp-
riated by the respondent and its predecessors, who had used 
the water continuously from 1905 to 1934. The water, 
therefore, was not subject to appropriation at the time of 
the pumping to Manning. . It is not possible for this three-
year use by Manning to be considered as an acquisition of 
title by adverse use. First, because the adverse use period 
is seven years, and secondly, because during the year 1934, 
Ernest Carson was by his own admission watermaster of 
the stream. As to the adverse use period, see Wellsville 
East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land and Livestock, 
104 'Utah 448, 137 P. (2d) 634. As to the fact that Carson 
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could not adverse the people for whom he worked as wa-
ter master, see Center Creek Water and Irrigation Com-
pany v. Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, and Tanner v. Provo Reser-
voir, 99 Utah 139, 98 P. (2d) 695. At all times after 1934, 
Carson was either the water master in charge of the dis-
tribution of the water or president of the respondent com-
pany, and he ·certainly could have acquired no rights ad-
verse to it after 1934. 
Summary on this Point 
The evidence is conclusive that from 1905 to 1934 all 
of the water from the wells flowed directly to the springs 
and was. used by the respondent and its predecessors for 
beneficial use during all of those years. Carson, while wa-
ter master, pumped the water for a short time to Manning 
and thereafter \Vhile president of the respondent company, 
capped the wells from time to time. He made no use of 
the water himself, except as a stockholder in the respond-
ent company; his predecessor in the ownership of the 1.9 
acres never used the water e~cept as a member of the gen-
eral public, and Sunshine vVater Line Company didn't use 
the water at all after 1905. If usage alone will constitute 
an appropriation, the respondent appropriated all of the 
water by usage from 1905 to 1934. If usage alone will not 
constitute an appropriation, then the only statutory filing 
was the filing made by the respondent. Therefore, the wa-
ters either -could be appropriated by usage and the respond-
ent so appropriated it, or it could not, and, therefore, the 
application filed by respondent was effective to appropriate 
it. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
V:. THE RESPONDENT HAS AN EASEMENT TO 
KEE'P THE CHANNEL OPEN. 
It is clear from the evidence that since prior to 1886 
the Fairfield people have used all of the water from Fair-
field Springs (R. 147-149). (See also R. 150, 229). The 
wells were abandoned by Sunshine Water Line Company 
in 1905, and as outlined in the section next above, the wa-
ters ran free for the next twenty-nine years. All of the 
people in the Fairfield area went to the wells, filled their 
wagons, maintained a stand pipe to get the water from 
the well into their wagons, and used the same as though it 
were a public watering hole (R. 82, 69). There is no evi-
dence whatever that anyone ever interfered with this us-
age or that anybody ever asked permission to so utilize 
the land or the well. The spring area was always treated 
as a town picnic area, and the parties claimed the right to 
go to the springs at all times (R. 346). If the appellant 
Carson is ·restrained from interfering with the natural flow 
of the spring and the wells, there is little need for anybody 
to ever. cross any section of his land to get the water. There-
fore, the right of way is not particularly important. If 
the wells are left on, they will flow to the spring, and no-
body could stop them from so doing (R. 113, 389, 395). 
Carson, of course, was president of the respondent eompany 
at all times since the State Engineer required the capping 
of the wells, and there is no question that he capped them 
from time to time after 1942. Prior thereto the wells were 
apparently never capped except when Manning ·completed 
its pumping operations, for there is no evidence that the 
wells were capped prior to 1934 by anybody. There would, 
therefore, be little need to go up to the wells except to ob-
tain water, and this the public did for over thirty years 
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before the pumping to Manning. From there on, Carson, 
as water master and president of the company, managed 
the affairs. Certainly, there exists a right in the owner of 
these water rights to go up the natural ·channels for the 
purpose of keeping the flow coming do\vn as they have 
been accustomed to do for over fifty years. . There was no 
trouble in this matter until Carson attempted to dig a new 
ditch east of the wells and to divert the water from the well 
area so as to keep it from commingling with the springs. 
Carson is the one who is attempting to upset the status 
quo. 
When Carson permitted Manning to pump the water, 
there was much "grumbling" in the town, (R. 279, 342) 
but everyone needed work and nothing was done about it. 
The job of laying the pipeline furnised work to most of the 
people of Fairfield (R. 279). There was no organization 
among the water users at that time, and Ernest Carson was. 
the water master, so the people accepted the job and per-
mitted the water to be p~ped out of the area. Other than 
this short period of use by Carson, the water always has 
gone to the springs. Carson now wants to change this con-
dition which has prevailed for 45 years, and take the wa-
ter into his ovvn ditch. Fairfield is a very small communi-
ty of approximately fifty families, and almost everyone in 
the town is a user of water from the springs. 
VI. TRESPASSES BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
There is no doubt that the plaintiff trespassed on ap-
pellants' ground. There was no attempt to deny that such 
was the case, because surveys had been made and persons 
had gotten off the channels and the streams. There cer-
tainly is no evidence which would justify a finding that 
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once this trouble is settled, further trespasses will occur. 
The court found in favor of the appellants on the issue of 
trespass, and assessed nominal damages. There was no 
evidence of actual damage, nor could there have been. The 
country is typical desert, uncultivated ground, which 
couldn't possibly be damaged by people crossing it. It is 
hard for us to see any possible error which the court com-
mitted in refus.ing to enjoin the respondent from trespas-
sing on this ground in the future, and of course the nom-
inal damages are all that the appellants proved. 
VII. THE APPLICATION OF RESPONDENT IS 
VALID. 
Under Point No. 7 of appellants' brief, it is urged that 
the application is void. No authority of any kind is cited 
to support this contention. The application is in all par-
ticulars in accordance with the requirements of Title 100, 
Utah ·Code Annotated, 1943. It has every blank properly 
filled in and is not too indefinite as to location. Fourteen 
separate springs are specifically listed -by the exact point 
of issuance. The two wells in question are also covered 
by exact point descriptions. The application then defines 
the basin area in which the applicant proposes to open up 
the channels and appropriate water from the underground 
through the means of drains and tunnels. The drains and 
channels which applicant proposes to drill are not unduly 
long, and certainly the matter is tied down about as de-
initely as a spring area could be described. In view of this 
fact, no statutory mandate has been ignored, and no au-
thorities whatever have been assigned by appellants in sup-
port of the proposition that the application is void. We 
respectfully submit that the application is in strict accord-
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ance with the statute; that the same was examined by the 
State Engineer and \vas accepted by him for filing. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law are ex-
tremely detailed and are based on a lengthy momorandum 
decision written by the trial judge. The matter has had 
the most careful consideration of the trial judge. There 
is no finding of fact by the trial judge for which there is 
not direct supporting evidence. In fact, there is very little 
conflicting evidence, for even Carson claims little use of 
the water by him or his predecessors until 1934. It is clear 
that Sunshine Water Line Company stopped using the wa~ 
ter in 1905, and that it never again used the water, that it 
took up its pipeline, dismantled the pumping plant and per-
mitted the land upon which the wells were located to be 
sold for taxes. There was no attempt by Sunshine Water 
Line Company to convey the land or water to appellants. 
It did not have sufficient interest to defend the quiet title 
suit, and the court correctly found an abandonment of the 
water. Also, it is undisputed that for over eight years the 
water was not used at all by Sunsine Water Line Company 
or anyone in privity with Sunshine Water Line Company. 
Under the forfeiture statute then in existence, a forfeiture 
was conclusively shown. The water, therefore, reverted 
to the public prior to the tax deed to the land in 1913. 
Further, the appellants never had a deed to the water, 
but must rely on the fact that they acquired the water as 
an appurtenance to the 1.9 acres of ground. The evidence 
conclusively shows that the water was not appurtenant to 
the 1.9 acres, and, therefore, appellants have no privity 
whatever with Sunshine Water Line Company, because (a) 
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the water was not appurtenant, (b) they had no deed from 
Sunshine Water Line Company to the water or the land, 
and (c) the water had reverted to the public prior to the 
tax sale. 
The water came from depths of over 80 feet, and was 
clearly ground water which could be appropriated by usage 
alone until 1935. For 29 years from 1905 to 1934, the re-
spondent and its predecessors used the water for beneficial 
purposes all of the time. The only other use was by the 
general public as a public water hole, but there was not an 
exclusive use by anyone except the people who are now 
the stockholders of the Fairfield Irrigation Company. The 
short three-year use 'by Carson from 1934 to 1937 was too 
short to transfer title under the doctrine of adverse use. 
Further, Carson was water master in 1934, and thereafter 
president of the respondent company during the time he 
claims that he controlled the wells. 
We respectfully submit that the trial judge correctly 
decided the case, and that his decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I GEORGE s. BALLIF 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
